T19

See the scoped evidence_register and qualification_protocol. Structural plausibility, descriptive surveys and laboratory benchmarks do not alone identify a local commercial policy effect.

See the scoped evidence_register and qualification_protocol. Structural plausibility, descriptive surveys and laboratory benchmarks do not alone identify a local commercial policy effect.

Imitation and rival/platform responses can change a tactic’s effect, alongside demand and delivery changes. An observed decay or changepoint does not identify reflexivity as its cause. The model already distinguishes drift, regime change and topology change. Link those distinctions to a transition process influenced by the firm, rivals, platforms and external conditions. A changepoint alarm identifies a statistical change, not its cause. Test whether policy changes, delivery shifts, selection, competitor response or external shocks explain it.

• Filippou, Quach and Jha — Pseudo Incrementality Testing — 16 September 2026. Full preprint. Changepoint detection plus counterfactual forecasting, two GeoLift benchmarks and synthetic stress tests. Only one of three nominal 90% intervals covers truth in the stress test; weak controls yield large bias. Source: https://arxiv.org/html/2609.18257v1
• Martin Bichler — Agentic Markets — 6 June 2026. Full journal article. Conceptual synthesis of agent search, differentiation, market power and platform architecture. Source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12525-026-00906-y
• Quanyan Zhu — Agentomics — 9 June 2026. Full preprint. Formal/normative workflow-surplus and cooperative allocation framework. Source: https://arxiv.org/html/2606.14769v1
• Microsoft Research, Bansal, Mirza and colleagues — Red Teaming a Network of Agents — 30 April 2026. Primary report. Internal network of more than 100 agents; malicious-message propagation, borrowed reputation and provenance loss. Source: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/red-teaming-a-network-of-agents-understanding-what-breaks-when-ai-agents-interact-at-scale/
• Yan, Huo, Shang, Peng and Wu — CEO Arena — 28 September 2026. Full preprint. Eight-firm, 500-day stylized competitive environment; matched replacements, 27 main and 26 robustness runs. Private gain can coexist with aggregate market loss. Source: https://arxiv.org/html/2609.34821v1

• No fitted local coefficient or complete-policy deployment evidence is supplied.
• parameter uncertainty not fully propagated, small validation base, no guarantee that pauses are exogenous. Useful refusal conditions rather than a substitute for experimental design. C3/C5/C7.
• no new calibrated market experiment. Lower technical search costs do not guarantee exhaustive search, equal information, higher welfare or a particular equilibrium. C2/C3/C7/C8.
• the security-operations numerical example is hypothetical. Shapley allocation is a proposed normative benchmark, not an observed pricing equilibrium; coalition values themselves require estimation. C5/C7/C8.

Declare eligible population/business kind, target and denominator, pre-action information, policy/comparator/assignment, outcome horizon and coverage, cost/authority/configuration, uncertainty, causal assumptions, falsifier and expiry. Current coefficients/qualification remain unmeasured unless explicitly linked to local evidence.